IS AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY
STRONG ENOUGH
FOR TRUMP?
The Case Against
Panic
Francis Fukuyama
As
an American citizen, I have been rather appalled, like many others, at the rise
of Donald Trump. I find it hard to imagine a personality less suited by
temperament and background to be the leader of the world’s foremost democracy.
On
the other hand, as a political scientist, I am looking ahead to his presidency
with great interest, since it will be a fascinating test of how strong American
institutions are. Americans believe deeply in the legitimacy of their
constitutional system, in large measure because its checks and balances were
designed to provide safeguards against tyranny and the excessive concentration
of executive power. But that system in many ways has never been challenged by a
leader who sets out to undermine its existing norms and rules. So we are
embarked in a great natural experiment that will show whether the United States
is a nation of laws or a nation of men.
President
Trump differs from almost every single one of his 43 predecessors in a variety
of important ways. His business career has shown a single minded determination
to maximize his own selfinterest and to get around inconvenient rules whenever
they stood in his way, for example by forcing contractors to sue him in order
to be paid. He was elected on the basis of a classic populist campaign,
mobilizing a passionate core of largely working class voters who believe—often
quite rightly—that the system has not been working for them. He has attacked
the entire elite in Washington, including his own party, as being part of a
corrupt cabal that he hopes to unseat. He has already violated countless
informal norms concerning presidential decorum, including overt and egregious
lying, and has sought to undermine the legitimacy of any number of established
institutions, from the intelligence community (which he compared to Nazis) to
the Federal Reserve (which he accused of trying to elect Hillary Clinton) to
the American system of electoral administration (which he said was rigged,
until he won).
Daron
Acemoglu, an economist who studies failing states, has argued that American
checks and balances are not as strong as Americans typically believe: Congress
is controlled by Trump’s party and will do his bidding; the judiciary can be
shifted by new appointments to the Supreme Court and the federal judiciary; and
the executive branch bureaucracy’s 4,000 political appointees will bend their
agencies to the president’s will. The elites who opposed him are coming around
to accepting him as normal president. He could also have argued that the
mainstream media, which thinks of itself as a fourth branch holding the
president accountable, is under relentless attack from Trump and his followers
as politicized purveyors of “fake news.” Acemoglu argues that the main source
of resistance now is civil society, that is, mobilization of millions of
ordinary citizens to protest Trump’s policies and excesses, like the marches
that took place in Washington and cities around the country the day after the
inauguration.
Acemoglu
is right that civil society is a critical check on presidential power, and that
it is necessary for the progressive left to come out of its election funk and
mobilize to support policies they favor. I suspect, however, that America’s
institutional system is stronger than portrayed. I argue in my most recent book
that the American political system in fact has too many checks and balances,
and should be streamlined to permit more decisive government action. Although
Trump’s arrival in the White House creates huge worries about potential abuses
of power, I still believe that my earlier position is correct, and that the
rise of an American strongman is actually a response to the earlier paralysis
of the political system. More paralysis is not the answer, despite the
widespread calls for “resistance” on the left.
Many
institutional checks on power will continue to operate in a Trump presidency.
While Republicans are celebrating their control of both houses of Congress and
the presidency, there are huge ideological divisions within their coalition.
Trump is a populist nationalist who seems to believe in strong government, not
a small government conservative, and this fracture will emerge as the new
administration deals with issues from ending Obamacare to funding
infrastructure projects. Trump can indeed change the judiciary, or more
troubling, simply ignore court decisions and try to delegitimize those judges
standing in his way. But shifting the balance in the courts is a very slow
process whose effects will not be fully felt for a number of years. More overt
attacks on the judiciary will produce great blowback, as happened when he
attacked Federal District Judge Gonzalo Curiel during the campaign.
Trump
will have enormous difficulties controlling the executive branch, as anyone who
has worked in it would understand. Many of Trump’s Cabinet appointees, like
James Mattis, Rex Tillerson and Nikki Haley, have already expressed views
clearly at odds with his. Even if they are loyal, it takes a huge amount of
skill and experience to master America’s enormous bureaucracy. It is true that
the U.S. has a far higher number of political appointees than other
democracies. But Trump does not come into office with a huge cadre of loyal
supporters that he can insert into the bureaucracy. He has never run anything
bigger than a large family business, and does not have 4,000 children or in laws
available to staff the U.S. government. Many of the new assistant and deputy
secretaries will be Republican careerists with no particular personal ties to
El Jefe.
Finally,
there is American federalism. Washington does not control the agenda on a host
of issues. Undermining Obamacare on a federal level will shift a huge burden
onto the states, including those run by Republican governors who will have to
balance budgets on the backs of the default from Washington. California, where
I live, is virtually a different country from Trump land and will make its own
environmental rules regardless of what the president says or does.
In
the end, Trump’s ability to break through institutional constraints will
ultimately come down to politics, and in particular to the support he gets from
other Republicans. His strategy right now is clear: He wants to use his
“movement” to intimidate anyone who gets in the way of his policy agenda. And
he hopes to intimidate the mainstream media by discrediting them and
undermining their ability to hold him accountable. He is trying to do this,
however, using a core base that is no more than a quarter to a third of the
American electorate. There are already enough Republican senators who might
break with the administration on issues like Russia or Obamacare to deny their
party a majority in that body. And Trump has not done a great job since
Election Day in alleviating the skepticism of anyone outside of his core group
of supporters, as his steadily sagging poll numbers indicate. Demonizing the
media on the second day of your administration does not bode well for your
ability to use it as a megaphone to get the word out and persuade those not
already on your side.
While
I hope that all of these checks will operate to constrain Trump, I continue to
believe that we need to change the rules to make government more effective by
reducing certain checks that have paralyzed government. Democrats should not
imitate the behavior of Republicans under President Barack Obama and oppose
every single initiative or appointee coming out of the White House. It is
absurd that any one of 100 senators can veto any midlevel executive branch
appointee they want. In some respects, unified government will alleviate some
of our recent dysfunctions, which Trump’s opponents need to recognize. The last
time Congress passed all of its spending bills under “regular order” was two
decades ago. The U.S. desperately needs to spend more money on its military to
meet challenges from countries like China and Russia; it has not been able to
do so because the Defense Department was operating under the 2013 sequester
that was in turn the product of congressional gridlock.
Or
take infrastructure, which is the one part of the Trump agenda that I (and many
Democrats) would support. The country has been gridlocked here as well, with
the biggest source of opposition being the Tea Party wing of Trump’s own party,
who would have stymied Hillary Clinton’s own initiative had she been elected
instead. Trump has the opportunity now to break with the Freedom Caucus in the
House and push for major new spending on infrastructure, which he could do with
help from Nancy Pelosi’s Democrats. Even so, such an initiative will face
enormous obstacles due to the layers of regulation at federal and state levels.
It is these small checks that make new infrastructure projects so costly and
protracted. Anyone serious about the substance of this policy should see this
an opportunity to streamline this process.
It
is important to remember that one of the reasons for Trump’s rise is the
accurate perception that the American political system was in many respects
broken—captured by special interests and paralyzed by its inability to make or
implement basic decisions. This, not a sudden affinity for Russia, is why the
idea of a Putin like strongman has suddenly gained appeal in America. The way
democratic accountability is supposed to work is for the dominant party to be
allowed to govern, and then be held accountable in two or four years time for
the results it has produced. Continued stalemate and paralysis will only
convince people that the system is so fundamentally broken that it needs to be
saved by a leader who can break all rules—if not Trump, then a successor.
So
I’m willing to let Trump govern without trying to obstruct every single
initiative that comes from him. I don’t think his policies will work, and I
believe the American people will see this very soon. However, the single most
dangerous abuses of power are ones affecting the system’s future
accountability. What the new generation of populist nationalists like Putin,
Chávez in Venezuela, Erdogan in Turkey, and Orbán in Hungary have done is to
tilt the playing field to make sure they can never be removed from power in the
future. That process has already been underway for some time in America,
through Republican gerrymandering of congressional districts and the use of
voter ID laws to disenfranchise potential Democratic voters. The moment that
the field is so tilted that accountability becomes impossible is when the
system shifts from being a real liberal democracy to being an electoral
authoritarian one.
Francis
Fukuyama is senior
fellow at Stanford University and author of Political Order and Political
Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy.
Không có nhận xét nào:
Đăng nhận xét